on the offense when imposing sentences and less on the psychological and social circumstances of the accused-a focus that often led to light punishments.
Some feminist groups are strongly in favor of these rape law reforms. They demand the protection of the state, claiming that laws have the potential to transform attitudes toward women in general and those who have been raped in particular. They see criminalization as one of the means to protect women-to help establish basic ideas on right and wrong, good and bad (Brants & Kok, 1986) . Furthermore, some feminist scholars (see, for example, Ferraro, 1989) believe that legal reforms to criminalize rape will lead to changes in definitions of and attitudes toward rape, just as the introduction of harsher penalties for gambling, prostitution, and the use of illicit drugs did for these behaviors. Adherents of this approach see laws as expressing the prohibited nature of the behavior and expect that the threat of penalty will act as a deterrent. Moreover, emphasizing the symbolic utility of the law, they claim that new powers allocated to the police and harsher legal reactions toward rape are symbolically important because the enactment of new laws and regulations clarifies the state's disapproval of rape and domestic violence (Cromack, 1989) .
In contrast, many feminist scholars question the ability of the legal system to protect women and to address their concerns for two interrelated reasons. First, they are not convinced that legal reform can introduce social change. Second, they strongly distrust the motives of a patriarchal legal system and its willingness to change the gendered social order (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992; Snider, 1994; Spohn & Horney, 1996) .
Wariness of the ability of legal reform to institute social change is rooted in evidence of stark discrepancies between the outcomes of certain implementation programs and the reformers' intentions (Cohen, 1985) . Like other policy changes, the effectiveness of law reform depends on its enforcement, and there is considerable room for interpreting the law in the field on the basis of the enforcer's values and norms, which may diverge significantly from the original aims of the planner. In their study of shield laws in six jurisdictions in the United States, Spohn and Horney (1992) found that when judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys thought that the past sexual conduct of the plaintiffs was relevant to the sentencing process, they managed to circumvent the laws and refer to the victims' behavior during the trials, preserving prevailing norms (see also Brereton, 1997; Matoesian, 1997) .
Feminist research on the actual implementation of rape law reforms has shown that the objectives of the new legal sanctions were not necessarily met (Bryden & Lengnick, 1997; Schissel, 1996; Spohn & Horney, 1992) . Although new laws aimed to encourage women victims to complain, instructed police officers to file complaints, and imposed harsher penalties, evaluative studies of the criminal justice system's reaction to the crime have yielded inconclusive results in regard to arrests and the filing of felony rape charges. Although in some jurisdictions arrest rates increased (Gregory & Lees, 1996) , more women reported assaults, and victims were treated with greater sensitivity by the police, in others it was evident that the police belittled the victims' complaints (Hammer, 1989; Rose & Randall, 1982) . In some places, the possibility of gaining a conviction even diminished (Caringella-MacDonald, 1985; Davis, 1987; Gregory & Lees, 1996) . According to Ronald, Berger, Searles, and Newman (1995, p. 229) , the handful of studies that have examined the impact of law reforms on punishment have concluded that "punishments for offenders convicted of sexual assault appear to be more certain, but not necessarily more severe." These results led Matthews (1994, p. 184) to claim that "the state absorbed new ideas and granted new rights, but at the same time did not change social relations." Indeed, many feminist scholars have argued that legal reforms treat the symptoms rather than the root of the problem: the gendered social order (Caringella-MacDonald, 1985; Chunn, 1997; Liebes-Plesner, 1994; MacKinnon, 1982) . They have claimed that the new laws reinforce the marginalized role of women in society, particularly women's position as legitimate sexual objects. New legislation has not eliminated the humiliating attitudes of defense attorneys and sometimes judges toward the victims. Women are still seen as contributing to rape by their provocative dress or behavior and are continually criticized about their past sexual behavior and moral conduct. Thus, the processing of rape cases is both influenced by and reproduces traditional male and female social roles with regard to sex: Men are socialized to be the sexual aggressors and dismiss women's protests, and women are expected to be coy and reluctant (Ronald et al., 1995) .
In light of these reservations about rape reform law and its implementation, the present study examined the case of Israel, which amended its rape legislation in 1988, mainly worsening the penal response to the offense. Specifically, the study compared punishment meted out before and after the reform. More important, the study went beyond statistical findings regarding sentencing, incorporating an analysis of the judicial discourse during these periods. This sensitive but seldom-applied analytical tool is useful in that it reflects the effect of the gendered social order on the courts' response to these reforms.
RAPE LAWS IN ISRAEL
Until the end of the 1970s, violence against women in Israel was rarely considered a public offense deserving of legal and social attention. Issues related to rape, women's victimization, and the sociolegal response to violence experienced by women generated scant debates in public and official arenas. However, toward the end of the 1970s, voices were raised in the public arena and in political and legislative circles calling for a reevaluation of the status of women in various spheres of Israeli society (Azmon & Izraeli, 1993; Freedman, 1990) . In response to these demands, then Prime Minister Izhak Rabin appointed a special Committee for the Study of the Status of Women in Israel, which addressed various women's issues, including the legal response to rape.
In 1978, the subcommittee that examined issues of women in distress submitted its report, concluding that in most rape cases brought before the courts, judges placed undue weight on such extralegal factors as the accused's character and employment record and the harm to the accused in the future as a result of harsh punishment. The subcommittee claimed that these considerations led to light sentences, contradicting the aim of the legislature to deter further rapes (Summary, 1978, p. 228) . The committee members saw this situation as problematic for women and the legal system alike and suggested that the law be amended to establish mandatory minimum sentences for rape. These recommendations led to the establishment of the Aloni Committee-a combined parliamentary committee of the Legislation and Law Committee and the Internal Affairs and Environment Committee-to deal with various aspects of the rape law.
The Aloni Committee heard legal authorities' and other experts' opinions about the rape law. The conclusions and concerns of the subcommittee were reiterated by Attorney General Gabriel Bach (Protocol No. 12, 1978, p. 10) , who argued that he expected judges to inflict "maximum penalties in severe rape cases." Expressing concern about the increasing number of rape cases in Israel and emphasizing that rape should be seen as a disgraceful and shocking offense, a "disease which must be removed from our society" (Intermediate Conclusions, 1978, p. 3), the Aloni Committee recommended that the law be amended to ensure harsher penalties for rapists. Member of Parliament (MP) Wirshuvski demanded that life sentences be given to those convicted of rape committed in aggravated circumstances. He explained that in his view "rape in severe circumstances is like murder, similar to the taking of human life. It is possible to justify murder committed in certain circumstances. It is impossible to justify rape in any circumstances" (Protocol No. 19, 1978, p. 7 ; see also similar statements by MP Uriel Lynn in The Knesset Protocols, 1988 Protocols, , p. 2476 .
Between 1982 and 1991, the committee's recommendations were adopted and changes were made to the rape laws in Israel. Although the demand for corroboration was abolished in 1982 (Sebba, 1983) , the most comprehensive changes to the law were introduced in 1988 (Israel Criminal Law, Amendment No. 22, 1988 ; see also Hauftman, 1995) , when punishment became harsher. The new law increased the penalty for rape from 14 to 16 years of imprisonment (Israel Criminal Law, Section 345 [a] ). Although this may not signify a large quantitative change, it has symbolic value in that it expresses the seriousness with which Israeli society addresses such a crime. The reform legislation continued to see rape in grave situations as deserving an extreme sentence (20 years' imprisonment) and added two new circumstances to the existing ones. Thus, whereas prior to 1988, aggravated circumstances included the use of a weapon during the rape and gang rape (Law for the Amendment of the Criminal Law, No. 35, 1973) , it now also includes rape of a minor The amendments to the rape laws were accompanied by some discernible changes in public and official attitudes toward rape and violence against women. Gradually, the media started to report rape cases and publicize light sentences. Silvy Keshet, a female journalist for the widely circulated daily Yediot Ahronot, set out on a personal moral crusade, writing a weekly column that exposed light sentences given to convicted rapists. Furthermore, rape centers were established (Eillam, 1994) , and the police were instructed to deal seriously with rape cases (Karp, 1989) . In addition, Amendments 26 and 30 to the Penal Code (Law of the Prevention of Abuse of Minors and the Helpless), which were introduced in 1989 and 1990, imposed serious terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of injuring minors for whom they are responsible, expressing the negative response of Israeli society toward the sexual abuse of minors within families.
Against this sociolegal background, we set out to examine the impact of these changes in the rape laws in Israel. Specifically, we investigated whether the implementation of the new laws indeed reflects the legislators' intentions and meets 342 Affilia Fall 2001 the stated expectations to inflict harsher punishments for the offense.
CONTEXT
To measure the impact of the new laws, the study focused on the penal response to rape. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, we compared the legal reactions to those convicted of rape before and after the new legislation of 1988. Specifically, we compared punishments meted out to convicted rapists in both periods and content analyzed the court discourse in an attempt to reconstruct the sociolegal setting in which decisions about punishment took place. The study analyzed rape cases brought before all five provincial courts in Israel 3 years before the law reform was introduced (in 1985) and 3 years thereafter (in 1991). This selection allowed us to examine the judicial response to rape at some distance from the period in which the changes in the rape law were introduced. For these 2 years (1985 and 1991), we found 171 court records in which the perpetrators were charged, prosecuted, and convicted of rape (not including attempted rape or a mixture of rape and other offenses): 77 cases tried before the legal reform and 94 after it. The number of cases in both periods was further limited by numerous technical and procedural problems, such as mistakes in police registration lists, files that could not be located in the court archives, files processed in the courts, and files that included restricted material. Thus, only 64 cases could be examined in detail: 28 in 1985 (Group 1-before the reform) and 36 in 1991 (Group 2-after the reform).
In this context, it is important to note that during the examined period, the courts in Israel were not yet computerized and most of the relevant documents were handwritten. Files were stored in overcrowded archives, and the availability of court records was limited. However, these problems characterized both periods, and no difference in storage or registration was noted between the years. Thus, the difference in rape cases in the two periods, as well as the varying mortality rates, can be attributed to technical factors; they do not have significant meaning that may point to a marked change in the legal response to rape during this time.
It should also be noted that rape cases in Israel are always dealt with in the provincial courts, where serious crimes (which carry a maximum penalty of more than 7 years' imprisonment) are judged. These courts are located in five cities throughout the country: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beer Sheva, Haifa, and Nazareth. The courts in the first three cities, where most of the Israeli population resides, carry the heaviest loads of cases. In the rape files examined, 80% of the cases were dealt with by the courts in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Beer Sheva, and the other 20% were tried in the other two provincial courts.
PUNISHING OFFENDERS: LIGHT SENTENCING
As Table 1 shows, there were no major differences in the penalties imposed on rapists before and after the reform laws were instituted. In fact, there was a tendency toward lighter sentencing in the second (postreform) period: The lenient punishment of nonimprisonment increased from 7.2% to 11.1%, and the harshest punishment (more than 4 years' imprisonment) decreased from 17.8% to 13.9%. What is more alarming, the percentage of convicted rapists who received up to 4 years' imprisonment (a light sentence, considering the 14 to 20 years mandated by law) remained at a high of 74%. Clearly, the intentions of the Israeli legislature to change the legal response to rape dramatically were not put into practice. It should be noted that the proportion of plea bargains increased significantly in the second period. Whereas plea bargains were made in 39.3% of the cases in Group 1, this proportion almost doubled to 69.4% in Group 2 (for similar increases in other countries following legal reform, see Edwards, 1990; Los, 1994) . In most plea bargains, the prosecution agreed to change the charge from rape to a lesser offense involving lighter punishment in exchange for the accused's confessions.
It should also be noted that the profile of the convicted rapist remained relatively stable in both periods. Court files indicate that most offenders were Jewish (71.4% in Group 1 and 80.6% in Group 2); were relatively young, aged 21 to 30 (57.1% and 55.6%, respectively); and worked as laborers (part-or fulltime). During the second period, the rapists had more previous offenses (46.4% and 52.8%, respectively). When details about the criminal records were provided, they refer to a mixture of offenses, such as crimes against property, crimes against the public order, and crimes of violence (see Figure 1) .
The most notable difference between the two periods was the victim population (see Figure 2 ). Whereas 25% of the victims in Group 1 were minors, this percentage increased sharply to 47.2% in Group 2. Yet, despite a general atmosphere in Israel in which the abuse of minors was publicly and officially denounced, the type and severity of penalties remained unchanged.
JUDICIAL DISCOURSE: MINIMIZING THE RAPE
In an effort to understand why Israeli judicial authorities did not take advantage of the new options provided by the law, we examined the discourse created in the judicial process. Various studies have concluded that experts' decisions about their clients are influenced by courtroom networks, norms, and role expectations affecting case processing (Jacob, Chayet, & Merra, 1986; McAllister, Atchinson, & Jacobs, 1991) . Thus, we analyzed exchanges, utterances, explanations, and accounts by the participants in the course of the trials to understand more comprehensively the sentencing itself. To reconstruct the judicial discourse, we analyzed court files that contained sociodemographic data about the accused and the victims as 
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well as details about the offenses as they were recorded by the police and the court administration. More important, each file included a document written by the judge that provided a lengthy description of the offense, elaborated on the court's decision, and offered detailed explanations about the sentencing. We treated these court records as text containing specific, distinct structures with formal and identifiable properties (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Labov, 1982) . Utilizing a narrative analysis method (Riessman, 1993) and an interpretive approach (Agar & Hobbs, 1982; Haliday, 1973) , we sought repeated utterances and ideas in the analyzed texts, focusing on the representation of the offenses, the circumstances, and the attributes and activities of the litigants. We used first-and second-level coding procedures (Grinnell, 1997) to scrutinize the texts in order to map similarities throughout the protocols and to identify conceptual themes and patterns that shaped the intentions, ideas, and values of the participants in the judicial process (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1998) . The analysis points to unchanged judicial discourse after the rape laws were amended. In both periods, four patterns were found: normative discourse, pathological discourse, the discourse of the "other," and victimless discourse. All these discourses lessen the rapist's responsibilities, reducing the social problem of rape to the problems of a normal person (the accused) who was wronged, sick, or foreign (Dobash & Dobash, 1992) . This approach can be seen as a "political image, an ideological construct managed and perpetuated by the state and its control apparatus" (Morgan, 1985, p. 61) , maintaining the patriarchal gendered social order and state legitimation.
The Normative Discourse
The normative discourse involves assumptions about "normal" behavior and conduct in Israeli society. Most records include a multitude of claims and utterances expressing the court's attitudes about normativity. This gendered domain includes social and cultural expectations of a male citizen who behaves according to a defined set of norms related to family life, employment, and military service and who exhibits feelings of remorse and suffering. In most cases, the judicial authorities situated rapists within the normative framework of society and considered the future consequences of the conviction in that light. This approach legitimated consideration of the offender as a potential normative citizen whose membership in the community should be protected and led the judge to mitigate the rapist's punishment. Thus, a man with seven prior convictions for raping minors was sentenced to 3 months in prison and a 15-month suspended sentence, because, as the judges explained, "he pleaded guilty and convinced the court that he is attempting to behave in a normal way" (Case No. 3) (case numbers refer to the unpublished court files of rape cases analyzed for this article).
The centrality of family life and employment repeatedly emerged in the court protocols, emphasizing how the accused's commitment to these institutions was justification for light punishment. For instance, in a trial of an offender who raped a tourist, the judge claimed that although "this is an ugly and grave offense . . . the suffering of the rapist [from the trial] undermined his family situation" (Case No. 3). In another case (Case No. 14), the threat of damage to the family led to 18 months' imprisonment and an 18-month suspended sentence. A man convicted of raping his niece (a minor) was described as "attending his job regularly and about to get married" (Case No. 20) . He was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment and a 1-year suspended sentence "to allow him to build a proper and normal life." The centrality of family life was taken into consideration even when the offense was committed in grave circumstances: A father who raped his daughter and had a past conviction for a violent crime was given a light sentence because the court forced itself to "exercise restraint in such incest cases to avoid ruining the family and aggravating the relationships between family members" (Case No. 46).
Normativity in Israeli society includes service in the military forces. When an offender served in the army (sometimes only partial service), the judge highlighted it, claiming that the offender had served his country and thus should not be harshly punished. An offender who raped his friend's girlfriend received 2 years' imprisonment and a 2-year suspended sentence because "he had served in an elite army unit" (Case No. 32). Another rapist who "served in the army for three years and had become well integrated into civil life" received a 3-year suspended sentence (Case No. 2).
The normative discourse in the court extended beyond family, work, and military service to feelings. In many court records, the rapists are represented as loving or as feeling guilt and remorse, feelings that the judicial authorities saw as evidence of normalcy and an ability and willingness to behave in a normal way. The expression of such feelings legitimated the imposition of light sentences. Although a judge considered the rape of a minor by her former boyfriend a grave assault ("There is no doubt that his act and the fact that he raped the plaintiff twice brutally was excessive and beyond human behavior"), the judge was ready to consider that the offender "was motivated by her rejection of him and his hurt love feelings" (Case No. 37). In this case, the inhuman behavior was balanced out by moral attributes external to the rape: his feelings of remorse, her provocative behavior, his normative functioning in his workplace, and his military service. Weighing these two aspects, the judge decided "not to act according to the letter of the law" and sentenced the offender to 1 year in prison and a 1-year suspended sentence.
The suffering of the accused repeatedly emerged in the judicial discourse, again legitimating light punishment: "We must consider the accused's agony" (Case No. 6); "the trial tortured him mentally" (Case No. 60). Use of the accused's distress as an excuse for a light sentence is evident in the case of a dentist who raped his 14-year-old patient. Although the court had "no doubt about the seriousness and the despicability of the offense," the judge considered that the "accused had a tragic history and his family was suffering from the trial and that he does not have a criminal record, that he pleaded guilty and expressed his sorrow" (Case No. 45). Consequently, he received a sentence of 6 months of community service. As a result of the state's appeal, the punishment was changed, and a year's supervision by a probation officer was added.
Finally, when the offender was young (as was mainly the case), his behavior was judged within the context of normativity in his age group. In many cases, the judicial authorities saw the rapists as people who had not yet matured and thus could not be held fully responsible for an uncontrolled, onetime act. Considering that the offenders "are juveniles who have not committed an offense before" (Case No. 13), the judge in a case of three minors who raped a 16-year-old girl explained that they should not be punished harshly because they should not be removed from society. The three boys were sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment in a penal institution for juvenile delinquents.
The Pathological Discourse
Offenders who were defined as mentally or physically sick, yet who were declared able to stand trial, were portrayed as handicapped, deserving of protection by the judicial authorities who expressed tolerance of their incapacity. In such cases, the judges referred in their sentencing to the offenders' problematic personal, physical, and/or psychological backgrounds and frequently mentioned that "his health has worsened" (Case No. 11), "he is suffering from a mental disturbance" (Case No. 55), or he is "burdened with mental problems" (Case No. 9). For example, a man with a criminal record and a previous conviction for rape was again accused of raping a relative. In passing sentence, the judge exclaimed that "he had committed a contemptible offense while using physical force. The accused, who is married, suffers from epilepsy, and so is considered incapacitated and unable to work" (Case No. 5). The court claimed that "we need to ascribe significant weight to his illness." This consideration led to a 3-year prison term. Similarly, the judges attributed a rape committed by a man who impersonated a physician to "his mental disturbance" and sentenced him to 18 months' imprisonment and a 3-year suspended sentence. This judicial 350 Affilia Fall 2001 approach allows offenders who are defined as mentally and/or physically ill to relinquish responsibility for their actions and hence to receive light sentences.
Discourse of the "Other"
Some rapists were defined as "others," alien to Israeli society. Offenders who were new immigrants, who came to Israel from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, as well as residents of relatively isolated areas who committed rape while visiting cities, were portrayed as strangers who did not yet understand the accepted social codes. They were excused on the grounds that they misinterpreted the behavior and verbal messages of their victims. Take the case of a new immigrant from Uzbekistan who had committed a number of offenses in his country of origin and was convicted of rape in Israel. The judge claimed that in Israel, a woman is not the private property of her husband. The melting pot phenomenon in Israeli society requires us to teach foreigners commitment to existing laws in Israel . . . thus we cannot ignore the public interest requiring harsh, painful and deterrent punishment. (Case No. 56) Nevertheless, the man received only 2 years' imprisonment and a 2-year suspended sentence, because "we must take into account that the offender behaved according to accepted norms characterizing normal behavior in his country of origin." A similar consideration was voiced by a judge who imposed a 2-year prison term and a 2-year suspended sentence on a newcomer from Ethiopia; the judge claimed that the rape must be understood in the context of his being a new immigrant (Case No. 51). Similar judicial tolerance of rape, rooted in the lack of familiarity with the accepted code of behavior in Israel, is evident in the case of two Israeli Arabs who were found guilty of rape under grave circumstances. Explaining his decision to sentence them to 2 years' imprisonment and a 1-year suspended sentence, the judge said that he had to consider their "foreignness," which misled them in their interpretation of the victim's dress and behavioral codes:
There is no doubt that the transition from their birthplace-a small village-to the open and permissive big city made it difficult for them to face situations they had not encountered previously. This led to uncertainty and confusion regarding women's normative behavior. I accept their attorney's claim that they innocently believed that the plaintiff is not a decent and honest girl. (Case No. 46) The strangers' assumed misinterpretation of Israeli culture was sufficient to legitimate tolerance of their acts of rape and intolerance of women who were assumed to behave in a deviant way.
The Victimless Discourse
The rhetoric used in the courtroom relates to both the victims and the act of rape in an objective, distanced way. Victims seldom have a place in the judicial language, and their feelings and attitudes are rarely mentioned. Their absence is strikingly evident in that in the vast majority of cases (70%), they were not asked to testify during the trials. In fact, the discourse overlooks and minimizes the victim, turning her into an almost invisible subject.
Scant information on the victims' employment, family lives, military service, or other relevant data was found in the court records. Instead, in almost all the cases, the defense attorneys attempted to undermine the plaintiffs' reliability by referring to their dress and behavior. Thus, a woman's prior association with the accused, provocative clothing ("jeans and tight shirt," Case No. 24) or behavior ("she stayed out late at the pub," Case No. 16), residence in the accused's home, consensual sexual intercourse on other occasions ("she had several boyfriends before with whom she had sex," Case No. 31), use of contraceptives, and questions about relations with men and the victim's virginity were all mentioned. In 1988, the rape law forbade the defense to relate to the sexual history of the plaintiff to limit the 352 Affilia Fall 2001 admissibility of evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct. Although this type of question became rarer in cases brought to trial after the law went into effect, in some cases the defense counsels continued to inquire about the victims' sexual conduct without any comment by the judges. This emphasis on the victim's past conduct is at the expense of consideration of her suffering. Contrary to overwhelming evidence in the academic and professional literature documenting the physical and mental harm to rape victims in terms of daily functioning and interpersonal and family relationships (see, for example, Ferraro & Johnson, 1983; , the court discourse is characterized by a stunning silence toward the victims, who remain anonymous and vague. The courts almost totally ignored the physical and psychological damage inflicted on the victims, in spite of the victims' reports about the fear they felt, their concern about revenge against them for reporting the rape, and their unending suffering. When, in some cases, experts in this field (psychiatrists, psychologists, or physicians) were called on to testify, they were usually defense witnesses testifying to the suffering of the accused! This disregard for the victims was reinforced by frequent referrals to the rape as an "act." This terminology removes the victim from the offense and minimizes the disgust and shock of the rape. Such rhetoric enables judicial authorities to embrace contradictory attitudes in the same statement. On one hand, many judges portrayed rape as an "ugly and humiliating act" (Case No. 16), a "contemptible offense" (Case No. 57) that must be severely punished and publicly denounced. On the other hand, utilizing the victimless rhetoric, the judges detached themselves from the rape and the victims, seeing the offense as committed by persons who, for some understandable reason, made a mistake. Thus, general expressions describing rape as a despicable and repulsive behavior are usually followed by explanations justifying light penal reactions to this behavior.
Following this same pattern, even the rapists' expressions of remorse were directed not to the victims but to the court or to the perpetrators' families. A 37-year-old offender, for example, approached his parents, asking their forgiveness for the misery inflicted on them because of the publicity of the case (Case No. 11). Diversion of the act of forgiveness from the victims to neutral locations, such as the perpetrators' families or the court, strips rape of its personal context and contributes to the presentation of the offenders as decent persons who went astray.
NEED FOR WIDER SOCIAL CHANGE
In 1988, rape laws in Israel underwent a major revision that legislators expected to alter legal attitudes toward rape and rapists. The changes were to be expressed mainly by the infliction of harsher penalties on persons convicted of this crime. However, a comparison of rape cases tried in provincial courts before and after 1988 indicated that the legislators' aims and expectations were not met, at least not in the cases studied. Indeed, the sample cases analyzed in this article seem to represent a continued trend of lenient sociolegal responses to rape offenses in Israel, despite the more stringent legislation.
In an effort to understand why judges did not take advantage of the new legal mechanisms to fight rape, the article went beyond this quantitative comparison and content analyzed the judicial discourse created in the court. Textual analysis of the legal discourse in the courts showed that statements, utterances, and expressions referring to the rapist, the victim, and the rape remained virtually unchanged after the reforms of 1988. Even though changes in the rape law in Israel reflected a partial shift in certain social, political, and legal circles, these changes apparently did not filter down to the courts, which continued to use the same tools and legal logic they had in the past: adherence to the rehabilitative model of the offender and disregard of the victim and her suffering. Indeed, it was the centrality of the rehabilitative model that prevented the development of a victim discourse that focused on the victims' physical and psychological trauma. In this context, the increased use of plea bargaining can be seen as one mechanism that preserved the logic and tools of the court, because it led to lesser charges and hence lighter punishment and required only the consent of the offender and the prosecution, not the victim. This mechanism allowed judicial authorities to make concessions to the rapist, reducing the severity of the offense while continuing to ignore the plight of the victim.
Silencing the victims was facilitated by reference to the rapes in general terms (as "acts") that allowed the judicial authorities to avoid looking the victims straight in the eye. The use of general statements about rape and its social effects reduced and concealed the irreparable damage that had been done. This rhetoric can be seen as a substitute for the required harsh social reaction to rape and as lip service to society. Although the courts recognized the severity of the offenses, they weighed it against assumed harm to the offenders. As a result, the courts ignored the victims, focusing on the rapists and their social surroundings. This attitude stands in stark contradiction to the explicit demand of the legislators, who called on judges to consider more carefully the suffering of the victims, even at the expense of considering the rapists' personal circumstances.
The judges' clear disregard of the legislators' intents cannot be removed from the sociopolitical context and the specific historical juncture at which they interpret the law: "How we punish reveals much about dominant conceptions of social order, of gender, class and ethnic identity" (Snider, 1998, p. 12) . Law, punishment, and social control are sociopolitical devices, the development of which is linked to particular social orders and historical periods (Snider, 1994) . Thus, although legal changes are symbolically and practically important as mechanisms of social change, their implementation requires wider social shifts and the fostering of a supportive environment.
The findings of this study show that the analyzed legal discourse was influenced by dominant attitudes and patriarchal belief systems regarding male and female social roles and the "normal" conduct expected of men and women in Israeli society. Such contextualization of the legal discourse within prevailing social norms points to the limits of legal reform in affecting the outcome of rape cases. Thus, legal reforms can be effective only when they are accompanied by changes in the attitudes and perceptions of society in general, and judges in particular, toward the offense and the damage it does to victims.
This change requires, among other things, strengthening the victim's status in the courtroom and focusing on her suffering as a consequence of the rape. One small step in this direction was the addition, in 1995, to Israeli criminal law (Section 187 [b] ) whereby judges in rape cases are required to have probation officers prepare reports on the victims' suffering. Although empirical investigations of the outcome of this reform effort would be welcome, the effectiveness of the new law seems doubtful. It is not clear if and how such reports would affect the judges' decisions. Moreover, the probation office in Israel deals with offenders and has no knowledge of the harm done to victims or tools for assessing it. Nonetheless, any attempt to bring the victim closer to center stage in the legal discourse is a welcome step toward improving her status, which may encourage the more frequent use of the harsher punishments dictated by law. A sensitive account of the victims' traumatic experience can influence dominant conceptions among legal agents and eventually affect wider social beliefs.
But perhaps the best course to take to generate social change is to foster it in a context that combines formal rules with social and educational initiatives (see Edwards, 1990; Smart, 1989; Snider, 1998; Tang, 1998) . Social workers, who are in the unique position of being professional mediators between the formality of the law and human suffering, can be more actively involved in the legal and judicial arena, directing attention to the suffering and social rights of rape victims. As an important professional group of social agents, they can play a major role in consciousness-raising activities about the subordination of women in general and victims of rape in particular. Their efforts may help legal and judicial figures to listen more closely to the voices of victims, taking the victims' suffering into account in the sentencing process. Only with the aid of such social and professional activities can rape legislation have the desired impact.
